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Abstract: Following the spread of performance measurement (PM) in public orga-
nisations, a vast literature has developed on its functioning and difficulties. This
paper intends to investigate the relationship between administration activities,
which can by their nature have different characteristics, and PM systems. The
application of PM in the Italian ministries through the analysis of 1,511 objectives/
indicators shows the relevance of administrative activities in influencing the ability
to measure performance and suggests that neglecting this link is detrimental to the
evaluation system and undermines its ability to provide a reliable representation of
the contribution of public organisation in relation to performance.
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1. Introduction
New public management (NPM) has generated a new momentum for the performance measure-
ment (PM) systems, which were at the top of agenda in many countries, thus representing the
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pivot or one of the main elements in public administration reform programmes. Ingraham (2005)
states that for much of the twentieth century—and certainly since the 1980s performance has
been a siren’s song for nations around the world, mainly because although performance promises
may be difficult to keep, they are the right promises as they are the core of every governance and
accountability process in public administration.
Despite this wide dissemination, PM is often reported as on the weak points of NPM-based
reforms. Instead of supporting NPM-inspired measures, PM can become an obstacle in reforms
and a mere bureaucratic activity tending to self-legitimation rather than usefulness (De Bruijn,
2002), thus “hitting the target and missing the point” (Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 521).
Like the NPM (Pollitt, 2009), PM has developed more on an operational level linked to its
dissemination and operational implementation, often leaving out an in-depth theoretical reflec-
tion. On the other hand, the diffusion of PM took place on the basis of external guidelines and
inputs rather than on the basis of internal requests and conscious organisational needs (Arnaboldi,
Lapsley, & Steccolini, 2015; Dahler-Larsen, 2013; Diefenbach, 2009; Marra, 2017).
An analytical aspect to explore the topic of the measurement of administrative activities (i.e.
activities produced by public administrations), which is less contingent yet structural and trans-
versal, is the link between PM and the characteristics of the activity measured. Since Ouchi (1979),
several studies have examined the measurability of the activities of public organisations (Abma &
Noordegraaf, 2003; Davis & Stazyk Edmund, 2015; Ditillo, Liguori, Sicilia, & Steccolini, 2015; Frey,
Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013; Mascarenhas, 1996; Noordegraaf & Abma, 2003; Speklé & Verbeeten,
2014; Vakkuri, 2010). This study sets out to contribute to this debate by examining the data
obtained following the application of PM in the Italian ministries.
Overcoming the anecdotal nature of many analyses on the status of PM especially in non
English-speaking countries (Nasi & Steccolini, 2008), this study, through a documentary review in
11 ministries, analyses 1,511 objectives and indicators used to measure the performance of
administrative activities.
On the basis of the definition of ambiguity of the administrative activities proposed by
Abma and Noordegraaf (2003), based on the level of routine of the administrative action and
on the importance of the interactions with subjects that are external to the production
process, this study has two objectives: first, to check whether, on the basis of the data
collected, the type of activity measured is relevant in determining the ability of the measure-
ment system to frame performance; second, on the basis of the empirical analysis, to
formulate some considerations that are useful to raise awareness of the implementation of
PM in the activities of the public administrations. In other words, this article intends to
explore the connection between the characteristics of administration and PM in Italian
ministries in order to draw useful considerations in relation to the use of PM systems in
public administrations.
2. Literature review
Since the 1980s, the centrality of PM in the NPM paradigm is supported by the wide and transversal
diffusion of the mechanisms and practices of PM in various nations and public sectors (Ingraham,
2005; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). This spread is far from having exhausted its
propulsive thrust. In the face of a marked spread, the literature has analysed, without definitive
results so far, the real contribution of measurement systems to the performance of public admin-
istrations (Poister, Pasha, & Hamilton Edwards, 2013) and more generally the difficulties encoun-
tered by PM systems. PM has been questioned by many and accused of betraying the promises
associated with it (Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009; Sofyani, Akbar, & Ferrer, 2018; Ter Bogt, Van Helden,
& Van Der Kolk, 2015; Van der Kolk & Kaufmann, 2018).
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A critical approach towards the implementation of measurement systems that has found
wide support is the approach aimed at finding significant and widespread weaknesses in the
definition of objectives, indicators and in the link between indicators and objectives that appear
weak and unable to represent the real contribution of public organisations in terms of perfor-
mance (Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004). As some studies argue (Dahler-Larsen, 2013; Diefenbach,
2009; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002), these problems result from the difficulty of objectives and
indicators to fully and effectively represent administrative actions, thus generating a so-called
performance paradox (Meyer & Gupta, 1994), whereby the indicators used in the measurement
lead to an evaluation that is completely different from the actually achieved level of perfor-
mance. In other words, indicators loose their ability to tell the difference between good and bad
performances and, “as a result, the relationship between actual and reported performance
declines” (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002, p. 271). There is therefore a divergence between organisa-
tional objectives and measurement system (Dahler-Larsen, 2013; Smith, 1995), in which the
former are measured and only partially represented by the latter. Given the operational and
structural complexity of administrative procedures, measurement systems tend to focus on the
most easily quantifiable and short-term, and therefore measurable, aspects of administrative
action (“tunnel vision” and “measure fixation” phenomena, see Smith, 1995), leaving aside
qualitative, value-related and ethical aspects, which are however central to public activities
(Stewart & Walsh, 1994). As (also empirically) highlighted, indicators are more likely to measure
more easily quantifiable aspects than more relevant aspects, thus creating an information gap
(Bohte & Meier, 2000).
While some authors associate this problem with the intrinsic complexity of public action, others
point out that the definition of targets and indicators is often subject to phenomena of “gaming”
(Bevan & Hood, 2006; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Smith, 1995), i.e. the deliberate manipulation of
performance systems to secure advantages from the evaluation process by those who define
them, e.g. the phenomena called “Ratchet and Threshold” effects described by Bevan and Hood
(2006) and Kelman and Friedman (2009). A more theoretical level of analysis points out the need
to consider “performance measurement systems as social structures of interaction between
individuals and institutions” (Lewis, 2015, p. 8) going beyond an instrumental and rational vision
of PM to embrace a more mature vision taking into account the fact that measures, once
introduced, have their own autonomy and lead to different perceptions, behaviours and responses
from those who deal with them. In this way, PM goes from being a performance detection tool to
an instrument influencing the behaviours of organisations and individuals (Espeland & Sauder,
2007; Long, Burton, & Cardinal, 2002).
Alongside this debate on the limits of PM in public administrations, there are other contributions
that are based on a pragmatic approach and have sought to identify the factors favouring the
development of PM (Angiola & Bianchi, 2015; De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Franco & Bourne,
2003; Van Dooren, 2005).
With specific reference to public administration, De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) identify two
types of factors that impact on the adoption and implementation of PM systems. From a rational/
technocratic point of view, there are four factors favouring the adoption of a performance
evaluation system:
● Resources dedicated to measurement from personnel with PM skills.
● Information. The availability of adequate information regarding how PM works.
● Goal orientation. How organisations set goals and strategies for operational purposes.
● External requirements. The availability of requirements that favour the adoption of a PM
system, e.g. a legislative provision.
From a political/cultural point of view, the authors highlight three further factors.
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● Internal interest groups. The involvement and support of the people working in the organisa-
tion under evaluation legitimises changes and favours the use of the results.
● External interest groups and unions. Similarly, the support of those who work outside the
evaluated organisation (citizens, trade unions, political representatives) has an impact.
● Risk taking and attitudes. Organisational culture plays an important role in determining
acceptance of and change in PM systems.
These are not definitive or exhaustive classifications as they can be expanded with case-specific
factors or with the intention of underlining the specific contribution of a factor (Fryer, Antony, &
Ogden, 2009; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Suppa & Webb, 2016).
A common element among these factors is that they are connected to the PM system and to the
organisational conditions in which it is implemented. From a certain point of view, these factors
are therefore contingent, i.e. they may or may not occur in relation to actions taken or to the
presence of certain circumstances. However, there is a cross-factor, which is within the PM system
and is represented by the intrinsic characteristics of the activity under examination. The relation-
ship between the characteristics of the activities and their measurability has been highlighted by a
study carried out by Hackman and Oldham (1980) which states that as routines decrease and
ambiguity increases, activities are less easily measurable. Blankart (1987), while discussing priva-
tisation and the possibility of implementing it, identifies some services that are more easily
measured compared to others for which measurement is more complex. Mascarenhas (1996)
classifies all public functions of New Zealand’s public sector agencies according to the degree of
difficulty in measuring their outputs and outcomes, thus underlining the importance of adopting
different measurement systems based on the characteristics of the activity measured.
In relation to public services, Frey, Homberg and Osterloh (2013), inspired by Ouchi's article (1979),
affirm that output control is compatible exclusively with activities characterised by a high level of
measurability and attributability of outputs. Outputs must be observable and attributable and not
characterised by intensive interdependencies between the various actors involved (e.g. citizens, and
other public or private organisations). Otherwise, a PM system is exposed to dysfunctional effects such
as "goal of a displacement effect" or "multiple tasking effect". In other words, if there is no way to
measure what outputs are produced by the administrative action or if their identification is contro-
versial, the key assumption on which the assessment of performance is based is lost, which inevitably
paves the way to dysfunctions such as the measurement of partial or unrepresentative outputs.
A significant contribution in appreciating the relevance of the connection between measurement
systems and the activities measured comes from Noordegraaf and Abma (2003) who classifies the
activities into three sets on the basis of how much they are known (and therefore subject to strong
classifications) and contested (i.e. judged on the basis of shared standards).
Conventional activities are those characterised by routine activities that are well-known and
whose standards are uncontested. The outputs of the administrative process can be known,
measured and compared over time.
On the other hand, unconventional activities are characterised by non-routine, fuzzy, conflictual
and innovative processes. Their outputs can hardly be known, measured and classified. There are
no shared standards because they relate to areas with diverging interests and values that change
over time. These activities are unstable and make it difficult to measure results against pre-
established objectives.
Finally, transition activities are in an intermediate situation between these two cases and refer
to “many new and unknown elements of standards that are subject to discussion”.
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Abma and Noordegraaf (2003) present a similar reasoning starting from the consideration of the
ambiguity that characterises the activities (productive process) carried out by public
administrations.
The nature of the interactions between producer and consumers allows us to divide the activities
into those aimed at producing a pre-established output through a one-side interaction between
producer and consumer and the activities based on a two-side interaction where customers and
citizens are co-producers and actively influence the service. In this case, the nature of the
production process is characterised by two-side interactions.
The nature of the production process distinguishes between routine or repetitive and standar-
dised production and non-routine production.
Also in this case, the two authors conclude that a strong emphasis on PM is appropriate only in
activities characterised by a limited level of ambiguity, i.e. production processes with one-side
interactions, and by routines. In other cases, the use of PMs must be carried out with caution, since
the ambiguity of the activity being measured reduces the value of the evaluation results (Burgess
& Ratto, 2003).
From the NPM perspective, Speklé and Verbeeten (2014), while confirming the link between the
activity being measured and the measurement system, stress the importance not only of measur-
ing outputs but also of doing so from pre-established objectives and targets. This need requires not
only measurement skills but also the ability to establish targets through the preliminary knowledge
of production functions. In this respect, the authors define the contractibility of public sector
activities on the basis of their characteristics in terms of ability to set unambiguous objectives,
ability to measure outputs avoiding distortions and knowledge of production functions. Only high
contractibility activities are compatible with a use of PMs in terms of incentives as emphasised by
the NPM programme (Newberry & Pallot, 2004). In other cases (low contractibility), an incentive-
oriented use of PM leads to dysfunctional behaviours and distortions in managers’ behaviours.
However, for activities with limited contractibility, the exploratory use of PM can be applied in order
to identify areas of actions that require special attention or to report priorities or expectations in
terms of desired performance.
3. A long path with few results: the introduction of performance measurement in Italian
public administrations
The path leading to the introduction of PMs in Italian public administrations is here discussed. The
main bodies involved were ministries, as this kind of regulations apply to them directly, unlike
other territorial institutions and sectors with specific transposing regulations.
The Italian public administration has traditionally been characterised by an administrative
system based on an administrative law with a bureaucratic approach (Capano, 2003; Ongaro &
Valotti, 2008). This approach has undergone a major reform since the early 1990s (Ongaro, 2006;
Rebora, 1999). One of the most relevant benchmarks concerned the introduction of PM mechan-
isms (Minelli, Rebora, & Turri, 2008; Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Rebora, 1999).
The Legislative Decree 29/1993 is the first measure that provides for the internal evaluation of
the outputs of the activities carried out by public administrations. In this measure, it is easy to spot
a NPM-based approach: the definition of objectives to be achieved and their evaluation by the
political management bodies is the prerequisite for the full managerial autonomy of the managers.
However, a subsequent law (Legislative Decree 286/1999) defines the terms of the PM activity,
entrusting it with the task of estimating the congruence between the outputs obtained and the
pre-established objectives. For this purpose, the law provides that the offices and the subjects in
charge of evaluation activities are to be called “Internal Control Offices” (Secin) and to issue, at
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least annually, a report reserved to the minister on the results of their analyses, with proposals for
improvement.
Although the legal obligation encourages (or forces) all ministries to implement ways to mea-
sure performance, results have been very modest (Hinna, Meneguzzo, Mussari, & Decastri, 2006;
Minelli et al., 2008; Turri, 2007). Control activities are limited to verifying the achievement of pre-
established objectives in terms of compliance. All of this occurs without documents summarising
the activities that have been carried out and without further use of the obtained results.
Ten years later, the failure of the system outlined by Legislative Decree 286/1999 led to the
reform of the PM with Legislative Decree 150/2009. As acknowledged by the promoters them-
selves, this reform also has a NPM-based approach (Department of Public Administration, 2009).
The performance assessment system (called “performance cycle”) is based on two documents that
each PA organisation is obliged to adopt. The first, The Performance Plan, is a preliminary pro-
grammatic document to be adopted annually by 31 January by a political body, which identifies
the strategic and operational objectives and related indicators that are supposed to guide admin-
istrative actions during the evaluation exercise. The Performance Report, which is always approved
by political bodies, is a final document reporting the degree of achievement of the objectives and
highlighting possible shortcomings.
Both Legislative Decree 286/1999 and Legislative Decree 150/2009 provide for measures to link
part of the remuneration of the personnel working in public administrations to the results achieved
in a performance-related pay system. This measure applies in the first place to managers and
employees in charge of offices. In particular, Legislative Decree 150/2010 closely links the mea-
surement of organisational performance (i.e. the outputs obtained by the public administration
and its operations) with the measurement of individual performance (i.e. the evaluation of the
results obtained by employees in a performance-related pay system). The intention is to encou-
rage “the quality of work” and “the recognition of merits and demerits” (art. 1, Legislative Decree
150/2009).
From a methodological point of view, this legislative measure is based on three main points:
● general PM for all administrations and all their activities without distinction;
● the request to highlight and measure the achievement of “specific and measurable objectives
in concrete and clear terms”, in relation to a limited time span and “objectives that are based
on reference values derived from pre-established standards” (art. 5, Legislative Decree 150/
2009);
● the introduction of a series of measures to encourage the implementation the reform in
organisations, such as the creation of a national agency for the promotion of PM and the
reconfiguration of PM units called OIV—independent assessment body in each administration
(for a more complete list, see Table 1, which is based on the classification of De Lancer Julnes
& Holzer, 2001).
In general, law enforcement, supported by legislation and accompanied by enforcement mea-
sures, is widespread, but it is difficult to achieve the objectives for which it was adopted. The PM
documents have hardly become instruments wherewith the political authorities assign objectives
and verify their results. These documents are mainly descriptive and are limited to providing
contextual information on the activities of administrative bodies but do not take into account
the guidelines and, especially, do not report whether objectives are achieved (Barbato & Turri,
2017). Despite the fact that the 2009 Legislative Decree provided for the classification of individual
performance assessments into four groups, which were then cancelled by other regulatory mea-
sures to contain public spending, the measurement of individual performance produced outputs
that were not very differentiated and levelled upwards (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Rebora, Ruffini, &
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Turri, 2017). Thus, the link between PM and performance-related pay is reduced to a means to keep
distributing the result-based remuneration indiscriminately rather than becoming a management
tool to encourage learning (Barbato & Turri, 2017; Capano, 2003; Turri, 2007).
Following the acknowledgement of these difficulties in May 2017, the Legislative Decree 150/
2009 was amended with some measures that, while maintaining the previous system unchanged,
aim to strengthen (see Table 1):
● the link between PM and incentive measures;
● the organisational mechanisms for the implementation and support of the reform.
4. Research design and data
On the basis of what has been illustrated in Section 2, the expectation is that, in the presence of a
drive for the introduction and development of PM systems in the public administration, with the
same factors favouring the development of such systems being equal, some activities are measur-
able in terms of performance while others are measurable to a lesser extent. In this regard, on the
basis of the classification of Abma and Noordegraaf (2003), a distinction is made between highly
ambiguous and less ambiguous activities. Highly ambiguous activities are those characterised by
two-side interactions between producers and consumers, where customers and citizens are co-
producers and actively influence the service and the nature of the routine production process.
Conversely, low ambiguity activities are intended to produce a predefined output through a one-
side interaction between producers and consumers by introducing a routine production process.
Table 1. Interventions to favour performance measurement in Italian public administrations
Provisions of Legislative
Decree 150/2009
Elements added in 2017
Rational/Technocratic point of view
Staff with measurement skills and
information on performance
measurement
The Independent Assessment Body
(in Italian OIV) is required to have a
high level of professionalism
Creation of a national agency to
accompany the reform
OIV members only enrolled from
the national register (selective
criteria for enrolment and
obligation of continuous training)
Reconfiguration of the national
agency to accompany the reform
Goal orientation The entire process of performance
measurement is aimed at verifying
the objectives
Strengthened ability of the
National Agency to set out
guidelines for the performance
cycle
External requirements When documents of the
performance cycle are absent
performance bonuses and staff
hiring are prohibited to the
defaulting administrations
The mandatory nature of the
performance cycle is reaffirmed
and strengthened
Political/Cultural point of view
Internal interest groups Attempt to implement incentives
to involve the staff
Approval of key documents by
elected bodies
External interest groups and unions Participation of trade unions in the
definition of the criteria for the
differentiation of evaluations (art.
19) and participation of citizens in
the measurement of performance
(art. 19-bis)
Risk taking and attitudes Introducing a top-down change in
the way public administration
works by steering it towards results
–
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This paper sets out to explore these aspects starting from the analysis of the objectives—
indicators whereby performance is measured in the 11 Italian ministries in 2016. The objectives–
indicators, which totalled 1,511 as showed in Table 2, are included in the performance plans of the
ministries. In order to facilitate the analysis, objectives–indicators have been listed in a working
document together with available information in the documents examined (performance plan) in
relation to reference organisational units, target and formula for calculating such indicators.
For the reasons mentioned in Section 3, Italy is an interesting case for the following aspects: a
multiannual effort to implement PM systems, a progressive refinement of the conditions favouring
the development of these systems. But above all, the Italian case presents a PM-based experience
supported by binding measures, even accompanied by sanctions for non-compliance, which is
paradigmatic as it highlights the limitations of an implementation that does not take into account
the measured activities and the distortions that this choice entails. The choice to explore this
phenomenon at the level of ministries is due to the fact that the law that makes PM mandatory is
automatically implemented in ministries, whereas in other sectors, it was applied more gradually.
Moreover, the ministries represent a relatively homogeneous sector at least in terms of exposure
to factors that favour the development of PM systems.
In a NPM perspective and assuming a definition of performance as a production process in which
performances are the output of activities (Van Dooren et al., 2010 also in relation to the limits of
these definitions), the ability of each indicator to measure the output of a certain activity was
verified. The distinction between output and outcome has not been taken into consideration at this
stage (for further discussion on this subject, see Wilson, 1989). It was thus possible to distinguish
between performance indicators (output control) and process indicators (process control). With a
managerial approach, the first type of indicators focuses on the results of the administrative
action, not on the process and the behaviours that necessary to achieve them (Eisenhardt, 1985;
Frey et al., 2013). The second type is influenced by the bureaucratic administrative model (Weber,
1978) and does not focus on the output but on the performance of administrative activities by
verifying the compliance with rules, procedures and obligations.
For the output indicators, the relevance of the outputs detected in relation to the activity in
terms of representativeness was ascertained below with an additional examination. The output
indicators were therefore examined on the basis of their ability to effectively measure the
Table 2. Objectives and indicators in the performance plan
Ministry No. indicators No. indicators
Foreign Affairs 98 From 14 to 111
Cultural Heritage 188 From 212 to 299
Labour and Social Policy 77 From 300 to 376
Environment 96 From 377 to 472
Economy and Finance 225 From 473 to 794
Interior 102 From 9 to 13 and from 478 to 785
Education, Universities and
Research
156 From 795 to 950
Defence 48 From 951 to 998
Justice 71 From 1 to 8 and from 999 to 1061
Health 52 From 1062 to 1113
Infrastructure and Transport 152 From 1114 to 1265
Agricultural Policies 41 From 1266 to 1306
Economic Development 205 From 1307 to 1511
Total 1,511
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achievement of relevant results in relation to the administrative activity carried out. The literature
has long highlighted the tendency of measurement systems to focus on measurable aspects at the
expense of unquantified aspects of performance (Smith, 1995 in relation to tunnel vision and
measure fixation), thus providing information that is quantifiable but not relevant to understand
the real performance of the organisation as a whole. Moreover, this trend has been pointed out
precisely with reference to the spread of PM in Italian public administrations (Chevauchez, 2014;
Rebora et al., 2017).
Operationally, the simultaneous presence of two requirements was jointly verified. The first require-
ment is the reference of the indicator to an activity representing the administrative action carried out,
providing a relevant representation of the output achieved. This review was carried out starting from
the analysis of the activities carried out by the organisational units through the examination of the
tasks assigned to them, which were determined by consulting official documents (financial state-
ments, explanatory notes) and their websites. At the same time, the ability of an indicator to measure
the output or to provide contributions to quantify the resulting performance was verified, also in
comparisonwith expected targets. The notion ofmeasurement is quite complex. In empirical sciences,
certain conditions are required for measurements, more precisely “assessments with an intersubjec-
tive and objective character” (Mari, 2003). In essence, it is necessary thatmeasurement results provide
different observers with the same information; at the same time, measurement results must provide
information only in relation to themeasured object and not to its environment, whichmay also include
the observer; therefore, measurements of the same object under different conditions and in the
presence of different observers must produce the same results (Mari, 2003). In this analysis, in the
absence ofmore detailed information, the examination was aimed at verifying the ability to quantify a
performance by studying the measuring system of the indicator under examination.
The verification of this combination of relevance and performance measurability has allowed the
identification of a subset of indicators that can be properly defined as output indicators.
Subsequently, for each of the 1,511 objectives–indicators, the activities carried out by the
organisational units to which the objectives–indicators are assigned were considered in order to
ascertain the degree of ambiguity (Abma & Noordegraaf, 2003) of the activity to which the
indicator refers. The degree of ambiguity was analysed by examining two aspects. The first aspect
is linked to the routine or non-routine nature of the production process and is therefore associated
with the degree of standardisation and repetitiveness of the processes. The second aspect is the
importance of the action of third parties in determining and influencing the outcome of the
production process. On the basis of these aspects, a binary classification has been made between
indicators linked to highly ambiguous activities and indicators linked to less ambiguous activities.
Table 3 summarises the phases of the classification of the objectives/indicators under scrutiny.
By cross-checking the nature of the indicator (process or output) and the nature of the activity to
which it refers, the matrix below is produced (Figure 1).
The examination and classification of the objectives–indicators was carried out in advance
separately by each of the three researchers after sharing the criteria. The researchers then
compared the divergent results and reached a common position after a detailed discussion on
the subject.
5. Results and discussion
The analysis of the PM system in the Italian case was based on the detailed examination of the
1,511 indicators and the related objectives in the 11 Italian ministries (phase 1 in Table 3). First of
all, the nature of the indicators was examined and it was found that only 25% (376 out of 1,511)
are output indicators whereas process indicators (1,035 out of 1,511) still prevail.
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On the basis of these data showed in Table 4, we can confirm what the literature has already
highlighted in relation to the Italian case, i.e. the difficulty of the PM system to detect the
performance of administrative activities in terms of output and the resilience of the traditional
Table 3. Analysis phases and classification of objectives/indicators
Phase Description Primary references
1 Classification of objectives/indicators into
● Output control focuses on the results of the administrative
action, not on the process and the behaviours that necessary to
achieve them
● Process control not focus on the output but on the performance
of administrative activities by verifying the compliance with rules,
procedures and obligations
Weber (1978); Ouchi (1979);
Eisenhardt (1985); Frey et al.
(2013)
2 Classification of objectives/indicators into
• Relevant output indicator:
1. Reference to an activity representing the administrative action
carried out, providing a relevant representation of the output
achieved
2. Good performance measurability
• Not relevant output indicator
1. Reference to a marginal activity, providing a not relevant
representation of the output achieved
2. Low-performance measurability
Smith (1995); Mari (2003);
Caglio and Dittilo (2008); Frey
et al. (2013); Chevauchez
(2014); Speklé et al. (2014);
Ditillo et al. (2015); Rebora,
G., R. Ruffini and M. Turri
(2017)
3 Classification of objectives/indicators into
• highly ambiguous activities:
1. Not routine activity (weak degree of standardisation and low
repetitiveness of the processes)
2. Two-side interactions between producers and consumers, where
customers and citizens are co-producers and actively influence
the service and the nature of the routine production process
• Low ambiguous activities:
1. Routine activity (strong degree of standardisation and high
repetitiveness of the processes)
2. Produce a predefined output through a one-side interaction
between producers and consumers by introducing a routine
production process
Ouchi (1979); Abma and
Noordegraaf (2003); Speklé
et al. (2014)
Table 4. Process and output indicators and ministries
Ministry Output indicators Process indicators
Foreign Affairs 20 78
Cultural Heritage 20 168
Labour and Social Policy 21 56
Environment 29 67








Infrastructure and Transport 106 46
Agricultural Policies 17 24
Economic Development 49 156
Total 376 1,135
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administrative model based on bureaucratic process controls (Bonini Baraldi, 2014; Capano, 2003;
Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Rebora et al., 2017). It should be noted that the main purpose of a PM-
based system is to measure performance and not the production process.
Instead of measuring the outputs of the ministerial activity, the control system ensures that the
procedures for the drafting of documents have been followed (drafting of the technical specifica-
tions of the tender for resources intended for rescue in historic centres #782) and verifies the
performance of administrative activities (incoming certified email messages processed through an
internal management system; outgoing certified email via PEC #600) and in general the ability to
Table 5. Output indicators including ministry and distinction between relevant and not rele-
vant indicators
Ministry Output indicators Of which relevant Of which not relevant
Foreign Affairs 20 4 16
Cultural Heritage 20 12 8
Labour and Social Policy 21 9 12
Environment 29 12 17
Economy and Finance 12 9 3




Defence 16 14 2
Justice 21 19 2




Agricultural Policies 17 4 13
Economic Development 49 17 32
Total 376 140 236
Table 6. Indicators related to low/high ambiguity activities by ministries
Ministry Low ambiguity activities High ambiguity activities
Foreign Affairs 34 64
Cultural Heritage 110 78
Labour and Social Policy 12 65
Environment 24 72








Infrastructure and Transport 151 1
Agricultural Policies 13 28
Economic Development 50 155
Total 768 743
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meet regulatory requirements (degree of adoption of the implementing measures required by
legislative provisions #1027). A large number of indicators and targets are in relation to the
compliance with the deadlines of resource payments and transfers and the degree of usage of
the resources allocated to the offices. In this perspective, cost containment policies are interpreted
as a way to cut costs which is not connected with the achievement of results (reduction, in
percentage terms, of postal expenses of the government’s territorial offices and the police in
2016 compared to the expenses incurred in 2015 #794; reduction of programme-related costs
relating in the previous year #1109). Thus, process controls, which are rejected by the NPM because
of their bureaucratic approach, are in the limelight again. This trend benefits from the existence of
public expenditure containment measures and economic measures which, if interpreted in a top-
down and legalistic way, are not connected to the intention of producing cheaper outputs but
simply to cut costs without taking care of the consequences in terms of output. Despite the
rhetoric of managerialism, the bureaucratic paradigm is still hegemonic and capable of annihilat-
ing managerial pressures.
The difficulty in developing output indicators is even more evident by focusing on the link
between objectives—indicators, activities and the organisational units—to which the indicators
are associated. Focusing on the 376 output indicators, it can be noted that only a subset, 140
indicators (37%), can provide relevant measurements with respect to the activity to which they
refer (phase 2 in Table 3). In other cases, even though the indicator is connected to a generic
output, this is of little relevance for the achievement of the pre-established objective or for the
institutional objectives of the organisational unit to which the indicator is associated. In many
cases, in fact, the activity under examination is reduced to the possibility of organising visits or
meetings (bilateral and multilateral visits or meetings #44), to the number of projects carried out
(implementation of environmental communication projects #394) or to the number of checks
carried out (verification of safety management systems in the workplace #776). Each indicator
lacks the ability to represent and quantify whether these activities have a real result in terms of
achievement of the pre-established institutional objectives. Thus, although the system actually
measures the achievement of a result, it is not representative of the activities carried out by the
organisational units under examination.
The presence of a large number of quantitative indicators, which are however not very repre-
sentative of the whole objective and consequently of the public activity of reference, suggests both
a case of “measure fixation”, in other words, when a performance measure does not fully capture
all dimensions of the associated objective (Smith, 1995, p. 290), and a case of “tunnel vision”, in
which emphasis is given on phenomena that can be easily quantified, at the expense of unquan-
tified aspects of performance (Smith, 1995).
The overall figure of relevant output indicators (140 indicators out of 1,511, less than 10%)
mainly confirms the failure of the reform (see Table 5). Despite the legislative requirements, the
reform has only been ceremonially implemented and has not changed the way organisations
operate (Fattore, Iacovone, & Steccolini, 2018). The basic objective of a PM system is to measure
the activities produced. The data collected and analysed show that the reform has failed in its
purpose. Hence the question: What are the causes of this failure? Several studies have investigated
the reasons underlying the functional difficulties of the Italian PM system. These reasons include
the relevance of the national context and its administrative tradition (Capano, 2003; Cerase, 2017),
the need to consider the reactivity to measurement by taking into account the reaction of the
evaluated subject to evaluation, which may result in not very challenging indicators (Barbato &
Turri, 2017; Corte dei Conti, 2012; Micheli & Neely, 2010) and the prevalence of top-down meth-
odological indications that impose undifferentiated performance detection methodologies that do
not take into account specific organisational contexts (Rebora et al., 2017).
Section 3 has illustrated the legislator’s tendency to introduce factors that favour the imple-
mentation of PM at a rational/technical and political/cultural level. An effort has certainly been
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made both with the 2009 reform, which nevertheless appears to have produced modest results,
and with the 2017 reform, the effects of which cannot yet be seen on the basis of the data. If the
factors identified above undoubtedly play a role, there is another and different transversal factor,
endogenous to the PM system, which must be considered: the intrinsic characteristics of the
activity being measured in terms of ambiguity.
A first analysis in this regard shows how out of 1,511 indicators considered, 743 (49%) are
related to ambiguous activities or low level of routine and two-side interactions, whereas 768
(51%) indicators are associated with activities characterised by low ambiguity or high level of
routine and one-side interactions (phase 3 in Table 3). This figure must be considered with caution.
In fact, it is not possible to conclude that the proportion between indicators referring to ambiguous
activities and unambiguous activities is representative of the real division of activity in the
ministries. In fact, the data observed in Table 6 do not provide any assurance with regard to the
real distribution of more or less ambiguous activities in the ministries but only allow ascertaining
characteristics in terms of ambiguity of the activities to which the indicators refer.
By crossing the characteristics of the indicators in terms of output/process and in terms of the
level of ambiguity of the activities to which the indicators refer, the following matrix is obtained. As
regards the output indicators, the overall value and the value referring to the actually relevant
indicators are reported.
The first quadrant shows process indicators associated with highly ambiguous activities. This is the
largest set of indicators. This is why, for activities which are certainly ambiguous, such as “managing
relations with the EU in the field of development cooperation” or “promoting political issues relating
to international bodies and fora”, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses process indicators such as “time
taken to pay European Development Fund shares” (#24) or “number of meetings within international
organisations, forums and other venues, in which participation was assured” (#60). The second
quadrant shows process indicators associated with limitedly ambiguous activities. The Ministry of
Cultural Heritage and Activities and Tourism presents indicators such as “number of adopted require-
ments/total requirements to be adopted” (#132) and “timeliness of payments” (#179). Quadrants III
and IV show both the overall data and the data referring to the relevant indicators (in brackets). The
third quadrant shows the number of activities characterised by a low level of ambiguity and output
indicators. The Ministry of Justice collects performance information using indicators such as “evasions
from prisons and during transfers” (#1005) and “number of prisoners who have attended a course in
literacy and school education” (#1020). The Ministry of the Environment uses indicators such as
“increase in waste sorting” (#382). Finally, the fourth quadrant presents 27 significant output indica-
tors referring to highly ambiguous activities, which are shown in Table 7.
By examining the distinction of indicators in the four quadrants, it is possible to verify that
output indicators are more widespread among activities with limited ambiguity. As regards the
indicators referring to activities with low ambiguity, 28.9% are output indicators and 16.3% are
actually relevant output indicators. As far as ambiguous activities are concerned, the percentage
of output indicators is 21.5%, whereas the percentage of relevant output indicators even drops to
3.3%. The limited presence of output indicators relevant to highly ambiguous activities does not
occur only overall but in each ministry with the partial exception of the Ministry of Economic
Development (10 relevant output indicators referring to ambiguous activities).
Overall, the data collected in Table 8 show that in the case examined, the difficulty in measuring
ambiguous activities is greater compared to unambiguous activities. The data therefore confirm
the presence of a relationship between administrative activity and the type of measurement that
can be applied to it. When this link is not taken into account, as in the present case, where
regulatory requirements and methodological indications do not distinguish on the basis of the
activities carried out, there are consequences.
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First of all, some activities (in particular the unambiguous ones) can be more easily measured in
terms of output (Figure 2, quadrants II and III), in particular when relevant output objectives are
considered.
Second, the compelling drive to introduce measurements without emphasis on the activity being
measured favours the diffusion of irrelevant indicators, thus resulting in paradox performance, i.e.
Table 7. List of relevant output indicators referring to ambiguous activities
Immigration and entry visa requests to Italy
processed within 25 days
57
Occurrence of extreme poverty #301
Percentage of children aged 0–3 who have accessed
childcare services (crèches, daily nurseries or
innovative and integrative services), out of the total
population aged 0–3
#302
degree of coverage of the survey of the services of the
EURES Advisers
#356
Effectiveness of dispute resolution processes #358
Mapping databases of public sector bodies for
communication to the European Union
#433
Coverage of operating costs of Carabinieri Corps for
the protection of environment
#466
Reduction of risk by stabilising/extending the average
life of debt
#579
Coverage of public debt securities auctions #580
Organisation/participation in joint return charter
flights under the coordination of FRONTEX
#628
Average time to send the device to parts #706
Planning and defining the teacher evaluation system #837
Rate of increase of first level enrolments in scientific
disciplines compared to the previous academic year
#872
increase in the number of sheep participating in the
plan (subsequent years)
#1275
number of farms participating in the plan to control
and eradicate IBR in cattle
#1277
Shows the percentage variation of offences in the
area
#1284
Increase in the volume of exports in the agri-food
sector compared with the average for the previous
three years
#1291
Percentage of increase of the gas transportation
network through methane pipelines (authorised km
on request of operators)
#1325
Optimising the use of frequency resources #1375
Reduction of the wholesale price gap of electric
energy compared with EU countries
#1393
Variation in the impact of fossil fuels on primary
energy consumption
#1394
Annual trend in car insurance rates #1401
Growth rate of enterprises #1422
Increase of value of exports to signatory countries to
free trade agreements with the EU
#1447
Growth rate of Small Medium Enterprises #1454
Growth rate of Italian FDI abroad #1491
Growth rate of Italian exports #1493
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the presence of indicators that focus on process or marginal aspects of administrative activities
and thus result in an evaluation that does not match with the actually achieved level of perfor-
mance (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). In particular, the use of process indicators leads to “sub-
optimisation” or “myopia” (Smith, 1995), which means that the focus is on specific aspects of
the production process while neglecting the overall process (Van Dooren et al., 2010). Moreover,
Table 8. Subdivision between output and process indicators in relation to activities with a low/
high level of ambiguity for each ministry
Ministry L P H P L O* H O* Overall
indicators
Foreign Affairs 30 48 4 (3) 16 (1) 98
Cultural
Heritage
93 75 17(12) 3 (0) 188
Labour and
Social Policy
5 51 7 (5) 14 (4) 77
Environment 14 53 10 (10) 19 (2) 96
Economy and
Finance
33 18 7 (6) 5 (3) 225




105 22 16(15) 13 (2) 156
Defence 29 3 14(14) 2 (0) 48
Justice 46 4 21 (19) 0 71
Health 15 19 6 (4) 12 (0) 52
Infrastructure
and Transport
45 1 106 (13) 0 152
Agricultural
Policies
8 16 5 (0) 12 (4) 41
Economic
Development
31 125 19 (7) 30 (10) 205
Total 525 610 243 (113) 133 (27) 1,511
L: Low ambiguity; H: high ambiguity; P: process indicators; O: output indicators.
*Number of significant indicators in brackets.
Figure 1. Matrix for the exami-
nation of the degree of diffu-
sion of PM in relation to the
type of activity detected.
Figure 2. Indicators in Italian
ministries according to activity
type.
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the use of non-relevant result indicators leads to issues related to measure fixation and tunnel
vision (Smith, 1995) as illustrated above. In these circumstances, particular attention is paid to
those aspects of administrative activities that can be easily quantified even if they are sometimes
marginal with respect to the achievement of results based on a “more is better” mentality,
whereby emphasis is placed on the production of some outputs without regard to the actual
quality of the production process (Bohte & Meier, 2000).
In this way, the actual ability of a measurement system to affect the performance of public
administrations is eroded. This difficulty in the measurement system also leads to the occurrence
of episodes of deliberate paradox performance or gaming by the actors involved in order to
maximise their usefulness (Frey et al., 2013; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). It is precisely the mismatch
between indicators and the actual output measurement that leads to the emergence of opportu-
nistic behaviours. This scenario cannot be supported by the data of this work; this tendency has
however been reported by other studies on the Italian case (Barbato & Turri, 2017; Corte dei Conti,
2012; Rebora et al., 2017).
All of this, moreover, condemns the PM system to a structural under-representation of indicators
and related ambiguous activities, given the difficulty in identifying output indicators, especially
when they are relevant. Essentially, some activities are not as exposed to the spotlight of PM as
others because they are less prone to be detected. The resulting risk is that measurement systems
produce a false representation of the activities, thus creating, as stated by Power (1997), a fictional
representation disconnected from the production process. The purpose of this representation is
essentially ceremonial, as it meets the need for external validation (Brignall & Modell, 2000).
The examination of the 27 output indicators associated with ambiguous activities offers, at least
in an exploratory way, some interesting insights. First of all, the majority of indicators do not focus
on the nature of the outputs produced by the productive process and measure the trend of the
social phenomenon underlying the administrative action. A certain amount of indicators of this
type can be found at the Ministry of Economic Development. Measures such as “incidence of
absolute poverty” (#301), “percentage variation of crimes in the area” (#1284) and “growth rate of
SMEs” (#1454) do not measure the output of administrative action but focus on the social
phenomenon related to it. The connection between administrative action and social phenomenon
is very complex, certainly a two-side interaction connected to environmental factors that are
beyond the control of the administration. Although it can be expected that, in such contexts, the
direct connection of the PM system with performance-related pay mechanisms may generate
resistance and favour gaming, the collected data show that there is room for an alternative use of
the PM system. The indicators can be used to explore the sense-making process of PM (Speklé &
Verbeeten, 2014) in order to identify areas of actions that require particular attention, to indicate
priorities or expectations in terms of desired performance and to draw the attention of the
organisation to the expected aims of public action.
6. Theoretical and managerial implications
On the basis of non-episodic data from to an entire sector of Italian public administration, this
study has highlighted a link between the spread of PM, i.e. output control, and the type of activity
detected in terms of higher or lower ambiguity. Failure to consider this link is also linked to the
presence of unrepresentative and paradoxical performance indicators.
On this basis, it is possible to make two final considerations—one technical and one theoretical
—which can shed light on the link between administrative activities and measurement. The two
following considerations are limited by the fact that they are drawn by the examination of a
specific reality: the PM system of the Italian ministries. Their value in other countries and in other
public sectors may be corroborated by future studies.
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The first concerns the issue of measuring the activities of public administrations. This study
confirms that there is a marked and deep-rooted delay in the culture of public administrations in
the approach to PM. Public administrations are still stuck with a metaphysical conception of
measurement, whereby it is believed that it must be aimed exclusively at measuring reality and
struggles to evolve towards an antimetaphysical conception, i.e. measurement as a means of
representing reality, and towards a relativistic conception that gives prominence to project intention
(Micheli & Mari, 2014; Rebora et al., 2017). Considering measurement as a technical and neutral tool
impoverishes PM by imposing an undifferentiated approach to the different activities which, on the
other hand, can be measured with different approaches, as demonstrated in relation to their level of
ambiguity. This view does not allow us to take into account the phenomenon of reactivity and the
natural propensity of the controlled to interpret and change their behaviour on the basis of control
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Lewis, 2015). This is a very significant issue. A more evolved view on
measurement is connected to a view of the PM system that does not aim at ascertaining the truth
but has the purpose of steering behaviours and results towards the desired goals by adopting the
most appropriate models and methodologies. The case under examination shows that this transition
has not yet taken place and reveals the limits of an unconscious application of PM instruments.
The second consideration is part of the debate on the introduction of the NMP in public admin-
istration and the subsequent difficulties. NMP-based reforms have been widely implemented in
Italy, as demonstrated by their spread driven by binding measures, but this implementation was
only superficial, as demonstrated by the prevalence of process control. The examination of the
factors leading to the introduction of PM in Italy shows that there was an effort to accompany PM,
albeit with a certain delay. The weakness of the system seems to be linked not only to under-
estimation at both technical and operational level but also to a weak theoretical and methodolo-
gical elaboration. This pedantic application mainly underestimated the intrinsic characteristics of
NPM and PM. In his 2003 textbook The Essential Public Management, Pollitt had already observed
this issue by explaining that the success of NPM-based reforms is closely linked to the degree of
publicness of the activities being reformed.
(. . .) many of the elements of NPM are drawn from private sector, so they should more easily fit
functions which are closer to the private sector in terms of their base characteristics. (Pollitt, 2003,
p.50–51)
The link with the activities is not accessory (Fountain, 2001). Conversely, it is essential for the
success of a reform and of the PM in particular, as the literature argues and this study demon-
strates. In Italy, not only was this link not taken into account, it has never been on the agenda in
the first place. This confirms a mainly nominal and mainly superficial approach that must be faced
not only on the operational level by implementing new solutions or supporting factors but also
primarily on the theoretical level with deeper reflection on various aspects including functions,
limits and possibilities of the instruments used. With this awareness, it is possible to extend the use
of PM to functions and activities to which it can hardly be applied, by enhancing its exploratory
value and its ability to direct measurement.
Funding











1 Department of Social and Political Studies, Università
degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy.
2 Department of Management, Economics and Industrial
Engineering, Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy.
3 Department of Economics, Management and
Quantitative Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano,
Milan, Italy.
Citation information
Cite this article as: There’s a lid for every pot! The rela-
tionship between performance measurement and
administrative activities in Italian ministries, Giovanni
Barbato, Alessandro Salvadori & Matteo Turri, Cogent
Business & Management (2018), 5: 1527965.
Barbato et al., Cogent Business & Management (2018), 5: 1527965
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2018.1527965
Page 17 of 20
References
Abma, T. A., & Noordegraaf, M. (2003). Public managers
amidst ambiguity: towards a typology of evaluative
practices in public management. Evaluation, 9(3),
285–306. doi:10.1177/13563890030093004
Angiola, N., & Bianchi, P. (2015). Management pubblico.
Una visione performance-based. Milano: Franco
Angeli.
Arnaboldi, M., Lapsley, I., & Steccolini, I. (2015).
Performance management in the public sector: The
ultimate challenge. Financial Accountability &
Management, 31(1), 1–22. doi:10.1111/faam.12049
Barbato, G., & Turri, M. (2017). Understanding public per-
formancemeasurement through theoretical pluralism.
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 30
(1), 15–30. doi:10.1108/IJPSM-11-2015-0202
Bevan, G., & Hood, C. (2006). What’s measured is what
matters: Targets and gaming in the English public
health care system. Public Administration, 84(3),
517–538. doi:10.1111/padm.2006.84.issue-3
Blankart, C. B. (1987). Limits to Privatization. European
Economic Review, 31(1–2), 346–351. doi:10.1016/
0014-2921(87)90050-X
Bohte, J., & Meier, K. J. (2000). Goal displacement:
Assessing the motivation for organizational cheating.
Public Administration Review, 60(2), 173–182.
doi:10.1111/puar.2000.60.issue-2
Bonini Baraldi, S. (2014). Evaluating results of public sec-
tor reforms in Rechtsstaat countries: The role of
context and processes in the reform of the Italian
and French cultural heritage system. International
Public Management Journal, 17(3), 411–432.
doi:10.1080/10967494.2014.935248
Brignall, S., & Modell, S. (2000). An institutional perspec-
tive on performance measurement and manage-
ment in the ‘New Public sector’. Management
Accounting Research, 11(3), 281–306. doi:10.1006/
mare.2000.0136
Bruijn, H. D. (2002). Performance measurement in the
public sector: Strategies to cope with the risks of
performance measurement. International Journal of
Public Sector Management, 15(6–7), 578–594.
doi:10.1108/09513550210448607
Burgess, S., & Ratto, M. (2003). The role of incentives in
the public sector: Issues and evidence. Leverhulme
Centre for Market and Public Organisation. University
of Bristol. Working Paper No. 03/071. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, 19(2): 1-29.
Caglio, A., & Ditillo, A. (2008). A review and discussion of
management control in inter-firm relationships:
Achievements and future directions. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 33(7/8), 865–898.
doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.08.001
Capano, G. (2003). Administrative tradition and policy
change: When policy paradigms matter. The Case of
Italian Administrative Reform during the 1990s Public
Administration, 81(4), 781–801. doi:10.1111/j.0033-
3298.2003.00371.x
Cavalluzzo, K. S., & Ittner, C. (2004). Implementing per-
formance measurement innovations: Evidence from
government. Accounting Organizations and Society,
29(314), 243–267. doi:10.1016/S0361-3682(03)
00013-8
Cerase, F. P. (2017). La «performance» e l’efficienza del
settore pubblico in chiave comparata. Amministrare,
1, 95–138. doi:10.1442/86993
Chevauchez, B. (2014). The use of performance informa-
tion in resource allocation. In S. Lanau, A. Tuladhar,
B. Chevauchez, G. Esposito, N. Jassaud, & S. Segal
(Eds.), Italy: Selected issues paper, Country report no.
14/284 (pp. 61–70). Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
Corte dei Conti. (2012). Indagine sulla Riorganizzazione dei
Controlli Interni ai Sensi del d.lgs. 150/2009: Ritardi
Applicativi e Difficoltà Operative. Rome: Sezione
Centrale di Controllo sulla Gestione delle
Amministrazioni dello Stato.
Dahler-Larsen, P. (2013). The constitutive effects of per-
formance indicators: Getting beyond unintended
consequences. Journal of Public Management Review,
16(7), 969–986. doi:10.1080/14719037.2013.770058
Davis, R. S., & Stazyk Edmund, C. (2015). Developing and
testing a new goal taxonomy: Accounting for the
complexity of ambiguity and political support.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,
25(3), 751–775. doi:10.1093/jopart/muu015
De Lancer Julnes, P., & Holzer, M. (2001). Promoting utili-
zation of performance measures in public organiza-
tions: An empirical study of factors affecting
adoption and implementation. Public Administration
Review, 61(6), 650–665. doi:10.1111/0033-
3352.00140
Department of Public Administration. (2009). Riforma
Brunetta. Cosa Abbiamo Imparato dagli altri Paesi,
Retervied May 29, 2017 from, https://www.ansa.it/
documents/1258368806214_altri_paesi.pdf
Diefenbach, T. (2009). New public management in public
sector organisations: The dark sides of manageria-
listic ‘Enlightenment’. Public Administration, 87(4),
892–899. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01766.x
Ditillo, A., Liguori, M., Sicilia, M., & Steccolini, I. (2015). Control
patterns in contracting-out relationships: It matters
what you do. Not Who You are Public Administration, 93
(1), 212–229. doi:10.1111/padm.12126
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985). Control: Organizational and
economic approaches. Management Science, 31(2),
134–149. doi:10.1287/mnsc.31.2.134
Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reac-
tivity: How public measures recreate social worlds.
American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40.
doi:10.1086/517897
Fattore, G., Iacovone, D., & Steccolini, I. (2018). Managing
successful change in the public sector’: A view from
the consultants’ world. Public Management Review,
20(4), 587–606. doi:10.1080/
14719037.2017.1340504
Fountain, J. E. (2001). Building the virtual state:
Information technology and institutional change.
Washington D.C., WA: Brookings Institution Press.
Franco, M., & Bourne, M. (2003). Factors that play a role in
‘managing through measures’. Management
Decision, 41(8), 698–710. doi:10.1108/
00251740310496215
Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M. (2013).
Organizational control systems and pay-for-perfor-
mance in the public service. Organizational Studies,
34(7), 949–972. doi:10.1177/0170840613483655
Fryer, K., Antony, J., & Ogden, S. (2009). Performance
management in the public sector. International
Journal of Public Sector Management, 22(6), 478–498.
doi:10.1108/09513550910982850
Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1980). Work redesign.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Hinna, L., Meneguzzo, M., Mussari, R., & Decastri, M.
(2006). Economia delle Aziende Pubbliche. Milano:
McGraw–Hill.
Ingraham, P. W. (2005). Performance: Promises to keep
and miles to go. Public Administration Review, 65(4),
390–395. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00466.x
Kelman, S., & Friedman, J. N. (2009). Performance
improvement and performance dysfunction: An
Barbato et al., Cogent Business & Management (2018), 5: 1527965
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2018.1527965
Page 18 of 20
empirical examination of distortionary impacts of the
emergency room wait-time target in the English
national health service. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 19(4), 917–946.
doi:10.1093/jopart/mun028
Lewis, J. M. (2015). The politics and consequences of
performance measurement. Policy and Society, 34(1),
1–12. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.03.001
Long, C. P., Burton, R. M., & Cardinal, L. B. (2002). Three
controls are better than one: A computational model
of complex control systems. Computational and
Mathematical Organization Theory, 8(3), 197–220.
doi:10.1023/A:1020767513183
Mari, L. (2003). Epistemology of measurement.
Measurement, 34(1), 17–30. doi:10.1016/S0263-2241
(03)00016-2
Marra, M. (2017). The ambiguities of performance-based
governance reforms in Italy: Reviving the fortunes of
evaluation and performance measurement.
Evaluation and Program Planning 2018 August, 69,
173–182. doi:10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.02.006
Mascarenhas, R. C. (1996). Searching for efficiency in the
public sector: Interim evaluation of performance bud-
geting in New Zealand. Public Budgeting & Finance, 16
(3), 13–27. doi:10.1111/1540-5850.01074
Melkers, J., & Willoughby, K. (2005). Models of perfor-
mance-measurement use in local governments:
Understanding budgeting, communication, and last-
ing effects. Public Administration Review, 65(2), 180–
190. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00443.x
Meyer, M. W., & Gupta, V. (1994). The performance paradox.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 16, 309–369.
Micheli, P., & Mari, L. (2014). The theory and practice of
performance measurement. Management
Accounting Research, 25(2), 147–156. doi:10.1016/j.
mar.2013.07.005
Micheli, P., & Neely, A. (2010). Performance measurement
in the English public sector: Searching for the golden
thread. Public Administration Review, 70(4), 591–600.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02180.x
Minelli, E., Rebora, G., & Turri, M. (2008). The risk of failure
of controls and levers of change: An examination of
two Italian public sectors. Journal of Accounting &
Organizational Change, 4(1), 5–26. doi:10.1108/
18325910810855761
Nasi, G., & Steccolini, I. (2008). Implementation of
accounting reforms: An empirical investigation into
Italian local governments. Public Management
Review, 10(2), 173–194. doi:10.1080/
14719030801928573
Newberry, S., & Pallot, J. (2004). Freedom or coercion?
NPM incentives in New Zealand central government
departments. Management Accounting Research, 15
(3), 247–266. doi:10.1016/j.mar.2004.03.004
Noordegraaf, M., & Abma, T. A. (2003). Management by
measurement? Public management practices amidst
ambiguity. Public Administration, 81(4), 853–871.
doi:10.1111/j.0033-3298.2003.00374.x
Ongaro, E. (2006). The dynamics of devolution processes
in legalistic countries: Organizational change in the
Italian public sector. Public Administration, 84(3),
737–770. doi:10.1111/J.1467-9299.2006.00610.X
Ongaro, E., & Valotti, G. (2008). Public management
reform in Italy: Explaining the implementation gap
international. Journal of Public Sector Management,
21(2), 174–204. doi:10.1108/09513550810855654
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the
design of organizational control mechanisms.
Management Science, 25(9), 833–848. doi:10.1287/
mnsc.25.9.833
Perry, J. L., Engbers, T. A., & Jun, S. Y. (2009). Back to the
future? Performance-related pay, empirical research,
and the perils of persistence. Public Administration
Review, 69(1), 39–51. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6210.2008.01939_2.x
Poister, T. H., Pasha, O. Q., & Hamilton Edwards, L. (2013).
Does performance management lead to better out-
comes? Evidence from the U.S. Public transit industry.
Public Administration Review, 73(4), 625–636.
doi:10.1111/puar.12076
Pollitt, C. (2003). The essential public manager.
Buckingham, UK: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill.
Pollitt, C. (2009). Bureaucracies remember: Post-bureau-
cratic organizations forget? Public Administration, 87
(2), 198–218. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2008.01738.x
Power, M. (1997). The audit society: Rituals of verification.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Rebora, G. (1999). La valutazione dei risultati delle ammi-
nistrazioni pubbliche: Proposte operative e di metodo.
Milano, IT: Guerini e Associati.
Rebora, G., Ruffini, R., & Turri, M. (2017). A serious game:
Performance management in Italian Ministries
international. Journal of Public Administration, 40(9),
770–779. doi:10.1080/01900692.2016.1201103
Smith, P. (1995). On the unintended consequences of
publishing performance data in the public sector.
International Journal of Public Administration, 18(2–
3), 277–310. doi:10.1080/01900699508525011
Sofyani, H., Akbar, R., & Ferrer, R. C. (2018). 20 years of
Performance Measurement System (PMS) implemen-
tation in Indonesian local governments: Why is their
performance still poor?. Asian Journal of Business and
Accounting, 11(1), 151–184. doi:10.22452/ajba
Speklé, R. F., & Verbeeten, F. H. M. (2014). The use of
performance measurement systems in the public
sector: Effects on performance. Management
Accounting Research, 25(2), 131–146. doi:10.1016/j.
mar.2013.07.004
Stewart, J., & Walsh, K. (1994). Performance measure-
ment: When performance can never be finally
defined. Public Money & Management, 14(2), 45–49.
doi:10.1080/09540969409387815
Suppa, A., & Webb N. J. (2016). What factors contribute to
success in performance management in the public
sector? An international comparative study of two
large Defense Organizations. International Public
Management Review, 17(2): 1-35.
Ter Bogt, H. J., Van Helden, G. J., & Van Der Kolk, B. (2015).
Challenging the NPM ideas about performance man-
agement: Selectivity and differentiation in outcome-
oriented performance budgeting. Financial
Accountability & Management, 31(3), 287–315.
doi:10.1111/faam.12058
Turri, M. (2007). I Fattori di Crisi dei Controlli nel Caso dei
Ministeri. In G. Rebora (Ed.), La Crisi dei Controlli:
Imprese e Istituzioni a Confronto (pp. 377–413).
Milan, Italy: Pearson Education.
Vakkuri, J. (2010). Struggling with ambiguity: Public
managers as users of NPM-oriented management
instruments. Public Administration, 88(4), 999–1024.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01856.x
Van der Kolk, B., & Kaufmann, W. (2018). Performance
measurement, cognitive dissonance and coping stra-
tegies: Exploring individual responses to NPM-inspired
output control. Journal of Management Control, 29(2),
93–113. doi:10.1007/s00187-018-0265-1
Van Dooren, W. (2005). What makes organisations mea-
sure? Hypotheses on the causes and conditions for
performance measurement. Financial Accountability &
Management, 21(3), 363–383. doi:10.1111/j.0267-
4424.2005.00225.x
Barbato et al., Cogent Business & Management (2018), 5: 1527965
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2018.1527965
Page 19 of 20
Van Dooren, W., Bouckaert, G., & Halligan, J. (2010).
Performance management in the public sector.
London: Routledge.
Van Thiel, S., & Leeuw, F. L. (2002). The performance paradox
in the public sector. Public Performance & Management
Review, 25(3), 267–281. doi:10.2307/3381236
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of
interpretive sociology. Berkely and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press.
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government
agencies do and why they do it. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
©2018 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
You are free to:
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.
You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
No additional restrictions
Youmay not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Cogent Business & Management (ISSN: 2331-1975) is published by Cogent OA, part of Taylor & Francis Group.
Publishing with Cogent OA ensures:
• Immediate, universal access to your article on publication
• High visibility and discoverability via the Cogent OA website as well as Taylor & Francis Online
• Download and citation statistics for your article
• Rapid online publication
• Input from, and dialog with, expert editors and editorial boards
• Retention of full copyright of your article
• Guaranteed legacy preservation of your article
• Discounts and waivers for authors in developing regions
Submit your manuscript to a Cogent OA journal at www.CogentOA.com
Barbato et al., Cogent Business & Management (2018), 5: 1527965
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2018.1527965
Page 20 of 20
